I. Definitional Issues
The copious literature on industrial policy does not provide a cohesive, unified definition of the concept. 8 Perhaps an acceptable baseline is thus to consider that "industrial policy embraces all acts and policies of the State in relation to industry". 9 Beyond this, and on pain of oversimplifying, economic scholars generally distinguish two main types of industrial policies. We review them in turn.
Targeted Industrial Policies
A first type of industrial policies are the "targeted industrial policies". Those policies have received a whole range of labels in the literature, including controversial ones, such as "picking winners, saving losers", "colbertist" or "protectionist" policies.
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The common thread to all targeted industrial policies -and possibly the reason for the controversy that surrounds them -is that they seek to assist specific firms or sectors, chosen discretionarily on the basis of lose undefined criterions (e.g., labour protection, regional development, defence interests, international trade strategy, etc.). 11 Often, thus, "targeted industrial policies" are perceived as arbitrary political interventions.
Targeted industrial policies are polymorphous. They resort to a wide array of measures that include trade barriers (tariffs, quotas, etc.), tax cuts, protective regulations, license requirements, limitations on public procurement opportunities, discriminatory standard setting, etc. 12 Interestingly, two popular instruments of targeted industrial policies are State subsidies and government-sponsored M&A.
Moreover, targeted industrial policies can be either reactive or proactive. Those policies are reactive when the State takes measures ex post to protect specific firms or sectors from 8 For a review of the definitions that have been given through time to the notion of industrial policy, see L. WHITE, "Antitrust Policy and Industrial Policy: A View from the U. The second family of industrial policy are the so-called "competitiveness policies". In policy circles, they are viewed as policies that seek to ensure a positive balance of payments, i.e. that firms of a nation are collectively able to earn foreign exchange through exports by competing with firms from other nations globally. In other words, they are a pro-active trade instrument. 18 They differ from the previous category in that they are not firm-specific.
Economists call them "horizontal" policies to denote that they apply to all firms of the economy.
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In general, competitiveness policies seek to correct "market failures" across industries, such as public goods, negative externalities, transaction costs, principal-agent problems, information asymmetries, coordination issues, etc. 20 Competitiveness strategies can take many forms, from the granting of subsidies (e.g., to promote investments in infrastructures, educational programmes, R&D activities, etc.), to the adoption of specific regulatory frameworks (on SMEs, technology transfer, public procurement, technical standards, etc.).
At this stage, it is perhaps worth recalling that significant market power ("SMP") is a wellknown form of market failure. Accordingly, it is justified to classify policies that combat SMP, and in particular competition policies, as part of "competitiveness policies". 21 At least this is the Commission's view. But competition policy is not the sole possible remedy for the elimination of significant market power. Alternative approaches include market-opening reforms (with sector-specific regulation), the subsidization of new entrants, etc.
And to make things even more complicated, competitiveness strategies and competition policy do not necessarily fare well. components. The first is price-competitiveness. It means that government should ensure that national firms are cost-efficient, or, in the language of economics, that they should achieve productive efficiency. This fares well with competition law, which is a good instrument to push firms towards efficient productive practices. The second component is non-price competitiveness. In a recent paper, Pascal LAMY, with his own words, defined non-price competitiveness as:
"those characteristics that cause a product to stand out positively among its competitors, regardless of price. In particular, it comprises know-how, quality and innovation, which allow a company to sell the same products as its competitors but at twice the price".
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Non-price competitiveness means, in other words, that government should make sure that firms enjoy some level of market power so as to increase prices above the competitive level.
This is not entirely consistent with the policy outcome that antitrust rules seek to attain, at least if competition law follows a "consumer welfare" standard. Non-price competitiveness may, in contrast, be acceptable under competition regimes that apply distinct welfare standards, such as total (or producer) welfare.
Synthesis
In our view, two main features determine whether a specific public initiative falls into one or the other type of industrial policies. Those features are the scope and the timing of the measure. The more transversal and ex ante (i.e. proactive) the measure, the more it can be deemed a competitiveness measure. Conversely, the more individual and ex post (i.e. in reaction of a specific market event) the measure, the more it relates to "picking winners;
saving losers" policies. 22 See P. LAMY, The Future of Europe in the New Global Economy, Notre Europe, February 2012 available at http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/P.Lamy_EuropeGlobalEconomy_NE_Feb2012_01.pdf
Figure 1: Cartesian Coordinate System of Industrial Policies
The boundary between "competitiveness policies" and "targeted industrial policies" is not always watertight. Accordingly, some industrial policy initiatives are difficult to classify. For instance, measures that create, promote and support business clusters may belong to either category, depending on their intrinsic features. Admittedly, such measures are adopted ex ante. They should thus fall within the "competitiveness policies" box. But the scope of business clusters varies significantly. Some business clusters are built around a broad research theme. Policies that support such business clusters accordingly benefit to many firms, active in distinct markets and/or sectors. Those policies thus come close to "competitiveness policies".
On the other hand, business clusters may involve a narrower set of firms active in a particular market and/or sector. Policy measures that assist such business clusters are closer to "targeted industrial policy" initiatives. And this is so regardless of their official designation (such measures are often said to be part of "competitiveness" agendas).
The bottom-line is that a case-by-case approach is warranted when it comes to classifying industrial policy programmes.
II. Positivist (or Legalistic) Analysis
Now that we have a better understanding of the notion of industrial policy, time is ripe to review if such considerations can play some role in EU competition law. In other words, is there an authoritative legal basis -textual or judicial -for the acclimation of industrial policy
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arguments in competition enforcement? In the following section, we first review this question from a general perspective (1), and then through the specific lenses of antitrust law (2), merger control (3) and State aid (4).
Competition and Industrial Policy in the EU Treaties
The EU competition rules do not form a stand-alone statute. They belong to a larger "framework" Treaty, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). This
Treaty lays down a variety of other policies, including an industrial policy at Article 173 TFEU, which embraces at least formally, the "competitiveness" variant of industrial policies. 23 One may thus question whether those policies -in the remainder, we call them "external" policies -shall, or not, influence EU competition enforcement, and how cases of conflicts between those policies must be resolved.
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In recent years, studies over this issue have sprouted. In a second, hypothetical scenario -they call it the "compromise" scenario -competition policy would prescribe for a "balancing process", whereby violations of competition law could be balanced, and exonerated, against other, explicit policy criteria, listed in dedicated "balancing clauses". Those authors find no example of any such balancing process in relation to competition law. They however use the example of restrictions to the free movement of goods under Article 34 TFEU, which can be balanced against explicit public policy criteria, pursuant to Article 36 TFEU.
In a third scenario -which also involves some sense of compromise -the Treaty introduces a so-called "cross-sectional" or "policy-linking" clause, which requests competition It is, however, not entirely unconceivable, on the basis of this case-law, to envision some space for industrial policy defenses within Article 102 TFEU, all the more so in respect of competitiveness policies. After all, the Court has been wary to ensure consistency across the various domains of EU competition law (this can be referred to as "tranversal consistency"). 
Merger Control
In this section, we review the same questions, this time in relation to merger control. Put simply, under the EU Merger Regulation ("EUMR"), 57 can the Commission forbid a procompetitive merger (2.1), or salvage an anticompetitive one (2.2), out of industrial policy reasons?
Industrial Policy as a Theory of Harm
The question whether the Commission can veto a merger on industrial policy grounds is mainly about targeted industrial policy and, more specifically, the protection of local EU firms against foreign operators. In this regard, the issue is whether EUMR enforcement can be selectively targeted against foreign operators, either to block their proposed mergers or to submit them to conditions, at the benefit of European players. To take a few hypothetical examples, could the Commission block a merger between non EU firms on the ground that the transaction creates a super-efficient industrial giant likely to outcompete European rivals?
Or could it attempt to forbid the takeover of a European firm by a foreign operator, simply because it is deemed strategically important to keep those assets in European hands. A cautious reading of the text of the EUMR suggests the absence of a legal basis for any such industrial policy offense. The concept of "industrial policy" is not even once mentioned in the text. Moreover, the core provision of the EUMR, i.e. the prohibition standard set at 2(3), only talks of a "significant impediment to effective competition". As if this was not sufficient, Article 2(2) further declares that mergers that do not significantly impede competition are presumably lawful.
Mergers can thus only be forbidden on competition grounds, and on no other consideration.
And twice in 1973 and 1981, 58 the Council rejected proposals to insert a wider "public interest" prohibition standard in the Regulation.
Industrial Policy as a Justification
In the EUMR, there is no "balancing clause" that can exonerate anticompetitive mergers out of public policy -and a fortiori industrial policy -reasons. Surely, Article 2(1) expresses a favourable stance towards mergers that promote "technical and economic progress". Yet, it insists in turn on the absence of any "obstacle to competition".
Things have, however, slightly changed with the introduction of an "efficiency defense" in the Commission thus introduced a "balancing clause" which entitles otherwise anticompetitive aid to benefit from an exemption.
Interestingly, the conditions under which an exemption may be granted attempt to transform the proposed "targeted industrial policy" measure into a "competitiveness" measure. 71 This can be seen in two distinct respects. First, the ailing firm must present a restructuring plan to the Commission that is supposed to lead to a redress of its competitiveness.
Second, and more remarkably, the Commission insists on the adoption of "adequate compensatory measures in favor of competitors", 72 whose purpose is to mitigate the targeted nature of the proposed aid, and to reintroduce a degree of horizontality, in the spirit of "competitiveness policies". In plain language, the Commission's view is that all market players should receive something: the aided firm benefits from financial support, its rivals obtain compensation. to our best knowledge, no cartel cases have given rise to "crisis-exemption" defenses.
In reality, the sole areas where the Commission may have planted industrial policy considerations are the numerous sets of Guidelines adopted to clarify the application of Article 101 TFEU. Yet, those texts resort to abstract and vague wording. It is therefore complex to identify industrial policy choices in those documents. All the more so given that in substance, those texts endorse an orthodox economic approach for the assessment of agreements, agnostic to industrial policy concerns.
Article 102 TFEU
The enforcement track record under Article 102 TFEU is more substantial. We can then test, in turn, whether the Commission has followed targeted industrial policy goals (2.1.) and "competitiveness policy" objectives (2.2), in enforcing Article 102 TFEU. 
Merger Control
In this section, we test whether, on the one hand, the EU merger enforcement practice has sought to achieve "targeted industrial policy" outcomes concerns (1.1), and on the other hand, whether it has sought to further the EU's competitiveness agenda (1.2).
Targeted Industrial Policy under the EUMR?
There are good intuitive reasons to test empirically whether the enforcement of the EU Merger Regulation ("EUMR") has espoused targeted industrial policy considerations. First, merger proceedings are less protracted, and more confidential, than standard antitrust proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU ("TFEU"). Thus, the Commission has possibly more leeway to play Lego with markets, hidden in the procedural shadow, and achieve targeted industrial policy results within short timeframes. Second, merger decisions are subject to light touch judicial scrutiny. In this field, Overall, there is thus scant evidence that the "targeted industrial policy" considerations play a role in current merger enforcement.
Furthering the EU's Competitiveness Policy under the EUMR?
A distinct question is whether EU merger control has accommodated "competitiveness policy" In the same spirit, the Commission recently republished a number of merger decisions with a view to help merging companies understand under which conditions they may close transactions before the Commission's final decision. 103 Such initiatives go at the heart of the "smart regulation" component of the EU's competitiveness agenda.
Overall, merger enforcement is not akin to industrial policy in disguise, even though there are clear areas of convergence between EUMR practice and the EU competitiveness agenda.
State Aid
In the area of State aid, things are again different, and also simpler. In particular, the One part of it is exposed by Commission's investigations and results in recovery orders -during the 2000-2010 decade € 14 billion were ordered to be recovered -while another part is constituted of "black aid" i.e. those illegal aid measures that are never detected by the Commission. Amongst those, the most likely measures to be kept secret by national authorities would logically be the most distortive measures since their notification to the Commission would automatically trigger prohibition decisions. A significant portion of "vertical" measures would thus remain undetected.
services. In other words, competitiveness aid measures are subject to a very liberal regime in EU competition law.
Overall, claims that the EU State aid policy is an anti-industrial policy are, in our opinion, baseless.
IV. Policy Perspective
In this last section, we attempt to address the difficult question whether industrial policy considerations should play a role in competition law enforcement. To that end, we first analyse whether the economic literature casts any light on this issue (1). We then seek to elicit the viewpoint of EU policy-makers on this issue (2). On this basis, we subsequently consider areas in competition enforcement where adjustments should be made to assist the EU's competitiveness agenda (3).
Overview of the Economic Literature
This section briefly sketches the pros and cons ascribed to targeted industrial policies (1.1.)
and competitiveness policies in the economic literature (1.2), and provides a short conclusion (1.3.).
Pros and Cons of Targeted Industrial Policies
Pros
Many arguments usually advanced in support of targeted industrial policies seem based on the need to keep, and possibly increase, economic activity on domestic territory (be it the territory of Member States and/or of the EU). On closer analysis, however, those arguments are more disparate.
Labour -The most standard justification for targeted industrial policies, and in particular protective ones, is that they can help saving "considerable amount of jobs and activities which would otherwise disappear" towards other territories. 114 In turn, such policies insulate States from a variety of short term economic losses (in the form of social insurance benefits, (re)training costs, etc.). or that assist domestic firms' internal growth (e.g., through the financing of certain investments).
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Political Independence -Selective industrial policy measures are sometimes justified on the ground that they concern sectors which are "strategic" for the political independence of the Trade Policy (2) -Finally, targeted industrial policy measures offer useful retaliation weapons against protectionist strategies of external trade-partners. 120 In this sense, such measures can help restore a level playing field in international trade, and protect domestic players from unfair competition strategies and other dumping policies that fall short of WTO law.
Entry -The so-called "infant industry" theory brings support to targeted industrial policy measures, in the form of government-sponsored mergers or subsidies to domestic players. The theory -which remains controversial amongst economists -121 goes as follows: where foreign players enjoy first-mover cost advantages (e.g., economies of scale, know-how, etc.), domestic new entrants may be secluded from the market. Public intervention may thus be warranted to help domestic newcomers overcome entry barriers, and in turn stimulate market competition (e.g., through a favourable stance towards merger transactions which entitle small domestic parties to build scale). 
Cons
Informational Issues -In modern economic theory, the main problem ascribed to targeted industrial policies lies in informational asymmetries. Markets often fail to deliver optimal outcomes because firms have imperfect information. This is a fortiori true of government officials, who are further away from the market than profit-making organisations. 123 exhaustivity and neutrality. Hence, faced with complex investment decisions -for instance, assessing the chances of success/recovery of a firm -government officials are in an even worse informational setting than market players.
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Capture -Economists also warn against risks of political "capture". Lobbyists may take advantage of the poor informational situation of government officials to convince them of the adequacy of a public intervention in their own private interest.
Public Choice -Government officials do not necessarily act in the public interest. 125 Elected and appointed officials often pursue their own self agenda, which is dictated by short-term reelection/reappointment constraints. 126 Government officials thus do not make optimal investment decisions, because they are biased towards those interest groups whose support is decisive for their re-election/reappointment.
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Fiscal Issues -Some economists claim -somewhat simplistically in our view -that discretionary industrial policies lead to overspending. 128 This would strain State budgets in the short term, and would require tax increases in the mid-term. Overall, such measures would be deemed to smoke out growth in the long-term.
Incentives -Public discretionary interventions distort firms' incentives to invest. Public decisions supporting a specific firm generate negative externalities for competitors whose superior efficiency is simply disregarded and neutralized. Firms contemplating green field investments may thus disregard countries with a track record of targeted industrial policy 124 The said informational deficit is, however, not always verified. For instance, it is argued that most State may efficiently build pockets of bureaucratic competence. See D. RODRIK, "Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century", op. cit., p. 23. Moreover, the said asymmetries of information may not exist where the State benefits from first-hand intelligence, as it is the case when it has direct control over a major player. Under such specific circumstances, the State is not in a worse situation than market operators. Hence, as an OECD report recently put it, the above-mentioned pitfalls are "not to say that policies aiming to create national champions are never justified. But Given the above, government interventions are likely to worsen market outcomes, and exacerbate third parties' distrust in public policy. 128 See M. DEWATRIPONT and P. SEABRIGHT, " Economic scholarship thus generally does not study competitiveness policies as such. The literature rather focuses on specific countries or on specific items of the competitiveness policy mix (for instance, education policy).
Short of straightforward theoretical evidence on the merits of competitiveness policies, most arguments remain indirect in nature. A first argument is that competitiveness policies should thus be deemed to enhance welfare, because its various policy items yield, by themselves, proven positive economic effects. 130 In turn, the evidence in favour of competitiveness policy should thus be traced back to theoretical economic papers on the welfare enhancing effects of labour market flexibility, 131 education policy, 132 innovation and technical change, 133 and other "structural reforms". Similarly, arguments in favour of competitiveness programmes can also be drawn from country-specific empirical studies. For instance, there are dozens of studies on the positive economic results of the HARTZ labour market reforms introduced in Germany in 2002.
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A second indirect argument is that competitiveness policies exhibit none of the shortcomings of targeted industrial policies. In particular, competitiveness policies are neutral and predictable. They are thus more favorable to risk-averse investors, who hate discrimination and unpredictability. Moreover, their neutrality shields government from socially wasteful rent-seeking activities, which distract firms from their core business.
Finally, proponents of competitiveness policies often like to point finger at empirical evidence of massive targeted industrial policy failures. Japan's technological decline since the 1990s or Nokia's ongoing demise in Finland are good examples of this.
Cons
Whilst less obvious, the flaws of competitiveness policies are nearly similar to those of targeted industrial policies. First, competitiveness policies also entail making winners and losers. Innovation-friendly policies bring a glaring illustration of this. Such policies can take many shapes. In some cases, governments will decide to strengthen IP protection (e.g. duration, scope, etc.), hence improving the situation of IP holders at the expense of competitors, licensees, users, etc. In other cases, governments will consider that a strong IP system reins in innovation, and will take steps to limit IP protection (e.g., through compulsory licensing orders, price regulation, etc.). In both cases -and regardless of what we believe constitutes the adequate innovation policy -such policy choices favour some interests and harm others. Think, for instance, to the conflicting interests of originating and generic companies in the pharmaceutical sector, or of the divide between software providers and the open-source community, etc.
Second, and in connection with the previous argument, competitiveness policies give rise to intense rent-seeking activities. Because they make losers and winners across the entire economy, the stakes surrounding competitiveness policy choices are even higher than with 134 135 The European Parliament eventually rejected the agreement.
Third, on empirical grounds, the contrast between the anaemic state of Western economies on the one hand and the impressive growth of economies such as China, South-Korea and India on the other hand casts doubts on the alleged superiority of competitiveness policies over targeted industrial policy. 136 Fourth, because they are horizontal in nature, competitiveness policies may lead to a "sprinkling" of resources on a large number of actors and areas, without significant effects
In recent times, a consensus has manifestly emerged that competitiveness policies should also incorporate some vertical elements including a focus on highly promising sectors. 138 Finally, conflicts amongst the various components of competitiveness policies may arise. For instance, inconsistencies between innovation policies -in particular, those that support strong patent rights -and competition policy are abundantly documented. In such cases, it is unclear which item should supersede the other.
Conclusion
Economic theory does not bring a firm answer on the merits of industrial policy. Like in other areas of economic theory, scholars are divided, possibly because of ideological biases. This, in itself, should not lead to discard the relevance of industrial policy as a whole. Rather, this suggests that this issue is primarily a matter of policy.
The Policy Perspective
As just explained, the question whether industrial policy considerations should play a larger role in competition enforcement is a policy issue, the answer to which largely hinges on personal beliefs. And it is not our intention to provide our personal opinion on this issue.
Rather, we want to elicit the EU institutions' mindset on this issue, through theological interpretation. In this respect, several official documents, pronouncements, etc. suggest that the EU institutions consider that the "competitiveness" declination of industrial policy should inform competition enforcement. At the same time, however, the Competitiveness Report praises the EU merger control regime because it applies with equal and neutral vigor to EU and non-EU companies.
Heads of State -
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In our opinion, the Report falls short of devising any policy prescription in relation to merger.
In our view, a possible approach would be to subject to heightened scrutiny all those vertical mergers that involve the acquisition (i) by non EU raw material suppliers, of downstream EU capabilities; or (ii) by non EU-players, of upstream EU raw material producers could be subject to heightened scrutiny.
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Finally, from a practical standpoint, DG COMP would be well-advised to draw a list of the main non-EU suppliers of raw materials, and engage, as proposed into the report, into a "fact finding" exercise, using its investigative powers to request information on their supply contracts with EU customers. The recent investigation into Gazprom's practices is, to some extent, a first step in this direction.
b). Innovation
The second strategic interest identified in the Report is entitled a "pro-active industrial innovation policy". The Report's chief concern under this section is that "research and innovation capacities in EU firms are numerous and of a high quality, but often small in size and fragmented along national and regional lines". 152 Measures should accordingly be taken to build large innovation capabilities on EU territory.
Having said that, however, the Report advances no practical proposition in relation to competition enforcement. A possible explanation is that under current EUMR law, mergers or coordination between innovating companies are already subject to favourable assessment standards (e.g., R&D joint ventures, transfer of technology agreements, etc.).
In this vein, we believe that on two particular aspects, the EU competition rules could undergo some adjustments. First, since the Report insists on the having large innovation capacities in the EU, one could argue that mergers (or cooperation agreements) between EU-owned firms should be treated more leniently than equivalent mergers (or cooperation agreements)
involving non EU-owned firms in EU competition law. Whilst we know that this suggestion will certainly be viewed as heretical by both economists and lawyers, 153 nationality. 157 To be more accurate, the idea is as follows. Mergers (and cooperation agreements) between EU-owned firms will generate more R&D investments on EU territory than mergers (and cooperation agreements) between non EU-owned firms. The former are thus more contributive to the EU competitiveness than the later. This, in turn, implies that the efficiency defenses in the EUMR and under Article 101(3) TFEU should kick in more easily (or be subject to a lower burden of proof) in relation to EU-owned firms' transactions in contrast to other transactions, where those efficiencies will primarily benefit to external territories (and consumers). More precisely, it could be considered that the efficiencies will more directly benefit to EU consumers, because those R&D investments will firstly spill over into macro (e.g., employment) and micro (e.g., product improvement) economic benefits in the territory of the EU. A related, yet still untested argument, is that where firms invest into R&D on the EU territory, this is likely to be followed by product launch in the EU before product launch in third countries.
A second area deserving possible adjustments is State aid. 158 Current State aid rules for research, development and innovation are based on the following logic: the closer the research project is from market, the smaller the aid should be. In turn, the legislation defines three categories of aids, namely aid for fundamental research, aid for industrial research and aid for experimental development that may be exempted according to decreasing levels of aid. 159 EU law thus clearly favors fundamental research over industrial and experimental research.
In our opinion, this exemption regime fails to address the so-called "Valley of Death" issue.
This concept refers to the widening gap between investments in fundamental research and its subsequent conversion into marketable products and services. 160 According to economists, many cutting-edge discoveries do not reach industrial stage, but die in the process because they lack support into the "proof of relevancy" phase. 161 Moreover, the preference given to fundamental research under EU law may contribute to an over-emphasis on upstream research projects, and to lesser investments into applied research, which is often where competitive advantages can be developed. firms with a view to appropriate some of their intangible assets. If those hypotheses were confirmed, it could be interesting to subject those issues to discussion within international foras, such as the International Competition Network ("ICN").
d). Restructuring
The last strategic interest that should permeate competition enforcement is the "transition to more sustainable and innovative production and/or new business models", in other words, the "restructuring" or European industry. According to the Competitiveness Report, restructuring should be a priority in the "the automotive sector, the basic metals industries, mechanical and electrical engineering, shipbuilding or the printing industry".
In those sectors, a more flexible approach under Article 101 TFEU (especially in relation to horizontal cooperation agreements), the EUMR and State aid rules may thus be appropriate.
Besides this, one related area -not mentioned in the Report -where EU competition law may need a fix is State aid, and in particular the rules on aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. In EU law, restructuring aids are treated severely. 164 Such aids are subject to rigorous conditions such as the "one time, last time" principle, or compensatory measures that mitigate distortive effects on competitors.
However, the existing rules pay little attention to the impact of the aid on the beneficiary's environment, in particular, when the latter is an ailing firm dominating a business cluster of smaller innovative firms. 165 The literature on business clusters shows that small firms often benefit from the presence of the business cluster leader for the industrial development of their researches. 166 Safeguarding the business cluster leader viability may actually be indispensable to help a network of innovative firms cross the above-mentioned "Valley of Death". In such circumstances, the Commission should thus balance the aid's anticompetitive effects with the 164 The exit of inefficient firms is said to be "a normal part of the operation of the market" while aids for rescue and restructuring operations are said to be " As surmised earlier, the legal principles that govern the interpretation of the EU competition rules may deserve some change. This is particularly the case of the defenses available under
Article 101, 102 and the EUMR to justify otherwise anticompetitive practices. If a fair share of efficiencies that result from transactions from/between EU owned firms (mergers, agreements and unilateral conduct) accrues more to EU consumers, than similar efficiencies yielded by transactions from/between non-EU firms, then this should be explicitly reflected in the law, in particular in Guidelines adopted under Article 101, 102 and EUMR. Alternatively, a lower burden of proof of efficiencies may be applied to transactions from/between EU firms, and a higher one shall apply to transactions from/between non-EU firms. For instance, whilst qualitative demonstration of efficiencies may pass the bar for transactions 167 The ability of the firm in difficulty to restructure would still be a necessary condition to any aid measureany other option would leave the door open to endless bailout plans -, but the indispensability of the firm for the good performance of the whole cluster would mitigate considerations on the harm done to competitors. This statement does not mean that any operator tied up with a plurality of stakeholders should see its business position be taken into account, though. Only regional, indispensable bridges over the Valley of Death would benefit from a plus point in the global assessment of the aid measure. For instance, the rescue of national flagship carriers is usually irrelevant for the industrial base: since stakeholders essentially lean upon the activities generated by the regional airport and may as well trade with a competitor air carrier, rescue measures may be dismissed. Conversely, the fall of the French Alstom would have inevitably dragged an otherwise very competitive industrial base into bankruptcy since no other firm could have replaced it as head of the regional cluster. from/between EU firms, a more sophisticated type of evidence (quantitative) may be requested from non EU firms.
V. Conclusions
The EU Courts believe that the competition rules shall not apply in a vacuum, disregarding other EU public policies, including industrial policy.
Until recently, the Commission has erred on the side of caution, and has promoted an where it actually matters, rather than (i) been dragged into endless revenue sharing disputes amongst hi tech players (in the field of abuse of dominance); and (ii) running a passive cartel policy, by dealing with leniency applications as they come by, through the mailbox.
